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Are Private Automobile Insurance Companies Replacing 
Workers’ Compensation Coverage When the 
Employee/Insured is Injured in the Course and Scope of 
Employment by a Third-Party Tortfeasor?: Rubin v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 1 
MICAH ECHOLS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Multiple sources for recovery are available for an employee who is 
physically injured by a third-party tortfeasor in the course and scope of 
employment.  This is especially true when the physical injury triggers cov-
erage under a health insurance policy or other type of insurance policy for 
medical benefits.2  First, assuming that the employer participates in work-
ers’ compensation insurance, the employee is entitled to receive workers’ 
compensation benefits for medical expenses.  Second, the employee can 
also recover payments for medical benefits from the third-party tortfeasor 
in a common-law negligence lawsuit.  Third, the employee, who in this 
context would be considered “the insured,” can also make a claim for 
medical benefits under a private health insurance policy, private automo-
bile insurance policy, or some other variety of private insurance.   
Although there are multiple avenues for recovery, the em-
ployee/insured is never allowed to receive and retain payments for medical 
benefits from all these sources.3  Different states have, however, given the 
workers’ compensation carrier, the third-party tortfeasor, and the private 
insurance company different rights in terms of their ability to subrogate 
and offset another entity’s payments for medical benefits in such situa-
tions.4  This Note will specifically examine the situation when an employee 
is injured by a third-party tortfeasor in the course and scope of employ-
ment, and there is also available coverage through the employee/insured’s 
  
 * Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Sally Loehrer, District Judge, Eighth Judicial District (Clark 
County), Las Vegas, Nevada during the 2003–2004 Term; J.D., 2003, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University; B.A., 1999, Brigham Young University. 
 1. 43 P.3d 1018 (Nev. 2002). 
 2. See generally Job A. Sandoval, Insured’s Receipt of or Right to Workmen’s Compensation 
Benefits as Affecting Recovery Under Accident, Hospital, or Medical Expense Policy, 40 A.L.R.3d 
1012 (1971). 
 3. See infra discussion on subrogation and offsetting, Part II.B. 
 4. See id. & infra discussion, Parts IV & V. 
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private automobile insurance policy in the form of benefits for medical 
payments (med-pay), which is also known in some jurisdictions as per-
sonal injury protection (PIP) or no-fault medical benefits.5 
In 2002, the Nevada Supreme Court held in Rubin v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Company that a workers’ compensation exclusionary 
clause in a private insurance contract does not apply where an injured em-
ployee subsequently recovers damages from a third-party tortfeasor.6  The 
recovery the employee receives from the third-party tortfeasor, however, is 
to be reimbursed to the workers’ compensation carrier until workers’ com-
pensation is made whole.  Finally, the Rubin court also allows the em-
ployee/insured to recover payments for medical benefits under the in-
sured’s med-pay clause of his private automobile insurance policy. 
This Note contends that under Rubin when an employee recovers 
medical benefits from both workers’ compensation and the employee’s 
own private insurance, the insured employee should either not be entitled 
to med-pay benefits from the private insurance company, or the private 
automobile insurance company should be permitted to subrogate against 
the third-party tortfeasor for med-pay benefits already paid to the insured.  
Many other jurisdictions support this approach.7  This Note concedes, 
however, that Rubin was correctly decided under Nevada law since subro-
gation of med-pay benefits in Nevada is against public policy.8  Although 
some states have allowed the same result as the decision in Rubin,9 the 
opposing view is better because it serves the purpose of no-fault med-pay 
benefits, discourages the windfall of a double recovery, and requires that 
physical injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment are pri-
marily covered by workers’ compensation. 
Part II of this Note will provide background information on no-fault 
medical benefits, subrogation and offsetting, and the collateral source rule 
as they relate to med-pay benefits.  Part III of this Note will report the 
  
 5. Note, however, that some jurisdictions have made PIP primary coverage and med-pay secondary 
coverage, although they both serve the same basic purpose to cover personal injuries sustained in 
automobile accidents. See e.g. Lawson v. Helton Sanitation, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Ky. 2000) (“Since 
the Med-Pay coverage is excess insurance over the PIP coverage, the PIP coverage is primary and the 
Med-Pay coverage is secondary, i.e., the PIP coverage must be paid in full before any part of the Med-
Pay coverage is due and payable.”); see also State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Swearingen, 590 
So. 2d 506, 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1991) (“The purpose of the [med-pay] coverage is to pay that 
portion of medical expenses not covered by the mandatory personal injury protection (PIP or no fault) 
which pays eighty percent of reasonable medical expenses up to a stated monetary limit, typically 
$10,000.00.”).  
 6. Rubin, 43 P.3d 1018 at 1022. 
 7. See infra discussion Part V. 
 8. Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 728 P.2d 812, 813 (Nev. 1986) (“We hold that a subrogation 
clause under which the insurer obtains subrogation rights from its insured for medical payments vio-
lates public policy.”). 
 9. See infra discussion Part IV. 
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facts, procedural history, and reasoning of the Rubin decision.  Part IV will 
analyze the Rubin decision using explanations from other jurisdictions that 
have reached similar results.  Part V will explain the problems associated 
with the Rubin situation, and offer alternate solutions, as reached in juris-
dictions other than Nevada.  Part VI will briefly conclude this Note.    
II. BACKGROUND 
A. No-Fault Medical Benefits10 
No-fault medical benefits are exactly as they sound–when an insured is 
in an automobile accident, he is entitled to payment for medical benefits 
regardless of who is at fault.  To receive no-fault medical benefits, the in-
sured need only present documentation to his insurer that (1) there is ex-
pense related to physical injury, which was (2) caused in an automobile 
accident.11 The purpose of no-fault medical benefits is to provide prompt 
payment for medical expenses to the policyholder without having to wait 
for the long and sometimes drawn-out process of making a claim with an-
other form of insurance.12  
B. Subrogation and Offsetting13 
1. Private Automobile Insurance Companies 
While no-fault medical benefits are focused on an insured’s recovery 
for injuries resulting from an automobile accident, med-pay benefits with 
  
 10. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Validity and Construction of No-Fault Insurance Plans Provid-
ing for Reduction of Benefits Otherwise Payable by Amounts Receivable from Independent Collateral 
Sources, 10 A.L.R.4th 996 (1981). 
 11. See McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 488 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Minn. 1992) (“It is 
enough if the victim accidentally injures herself. In other words, the focus is not on the tortfeasor; 
rather, no-fault benefit eligibility is dependent exclusively on the injured victim and whether she has 
been hurt under circumstances arising from the use of a motor vehicle. This is true first party cover-
age.”). 
 12. See Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 683 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 1997) (“No-fault reform 
was enacted to provide prompt uncontested, first-party insurance benefits. That is part of the price paid 
to eliminate common-law contested lawsuits. Indeed, contrary to the insurer’s assertions, preclusion of 
this type was an available remedy at common law, and if this important facet of the juridical rights and 
remedies among the various interested parties is to be deemed eliminated, it must be evident more 
plainly and expressly as this would be in derogation of a common-law protection. The tradeoff of the 
no-fault reform still allows carriers to contest ill-founded, illegitimate and fraudulent claims, but within 
a strict, short-leashed contestable period and process designed to avoid prejudice and red-tape dilatory 
practices.”) (citations omitted). 
 13. See generally J.A. Bock, Subrogation Rights of Insurer under Medical Payments Provision of 
Automobile Insurance Policy, 19 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1968). 
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subrogation and offsetting clauses are concerned with preventing double 
recovery by the insured for that same injury.14 
Subrogation occurs when the private insurer has paid med-pay benefits 
to its insured and the insured later receives additional recovery from an-
other source for the same physical injuries.  Subrogation is the insurer’s 
right for reimbursement of money that exceeds the medical expenses the 
insured has received.15  If the insured does not receive additional payment 
from another source, subrogation does not operate, and the med-pay bene-
fits function as no-fault benefits.16 
Offsetting occurs when the insured receives medical payments for 
physical injuries from another source before making a claim for the med-
pay benefits from the insurer.17  The insurer then can withhold medical 
payments from the insured to the extent that they have already been paid 
by the other source.18  As a corollary, when the medical payments have 
been paid in full by the collateral source, the insurer pays nothing to the 
insured. 
  
 14. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458, 458 (Utah 1969) (“Subroga-
tion springs from equity concluding that one having been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be 
entitled to a second reimbursement therefor.”); see also Thiringer v. Am. Motors Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 
191, 194 (Wash. 1978) (“Subrogation is an equitable doctrine, and an examination of the cases cited by 
both parties shows that courts, unless otherwise directed by statutory requirements, attempt to resolve 
each case upon a consideration of the equitable factors involved, guided by the principle that a party 
suffering compensable injury is entitled to be made whole but should not be allowed to duplicate his 
recovery. The insurer’s interest in its right of subrogation is, of course, always a factor to be consid-
ered.”). 
 15. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gropman, 209 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (Cal. Super. App. 
Dept. 1984) (“It has been clearly established in California that insurance contract provisions, although 
classified as adhesion contracts, requiring reimbursement of medical payments under the label of sub-
rogation but providing only access to the proceeds of settlement or judgment resulting from the exer-
cise of rights of recovery by the injured person, are valid and enforceable.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 441 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Neb. 1989) (“We now hold that a subrogation clause 
of this kind which gives an insurer a right to subrogation against a third-party tortfeasor for medical 
payments actually made is a valid and enforceable contractual provision. It is well established as a 
principle of equity that upon payment of a loss an insurer is entitled to pursue those rights which the 
insured may have against a third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. Applying this 
principle, the majority of jurisdictions have upheld the validity of insurance provisions which confer on 
an insurer a right of subrogation against third-party tortfeasors for medical payments actually made to 
its insured.”) (Citations omitted). 
 16. See Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 135, 136–37 (Md. 1988) (holding that insured who was 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits, but had not pursued workers' compensation claim, was 
entitled to recover full PIP benefits from insurer). 
 17. Unif. Motor Veh. Reparations Act § 11(a), 14 U.L.A. 41 (1980) (The Uniform Motor Vehicle 
Reparations Act provides that in calculation of net loss, the insurer shall set off recoveries of social 
security benefits, workmen’s compensation benefits, and state-required temporary disability insurance); 
see also Coreno v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 575 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (N.Y. Super. 1991) (finding that the 
no-fault insurer may deduct the amount of such benefits upon a mere showing of their availability; the 
right of the insurer to deduct is not contingent upon their actual receipt.). 
 18. See e.g. Berger v. Wien Air Alaska, 995 P.2d 240, 242–43 (Alaska 2000) (explaining that when 
an insured first recovers from a third-party tortfeasor, an insured can offset those amounts actually 
received by the insured). 
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The policy behind subrogation and offsetting acknowledges that once 
the medical payments for the physical injury have been made once, any 
other recovery for medical payments will not actually be used for the 
physical injury.  The alternative would result in a windfall for the insured.  
Additionally, whenever each insured is only entitled to one recovery, the 
insurer is able to offer med-pay coverage at a more reasonable premium.19 
2. Workers’ Compensation  
Unlike med-pay coverage, which is only sometimes subject to subro-
gation based on the jurisdiction, the workers’ compensation carrier can 
almost always subrogate against a third-party tortfeasor.20  The workers’ 
compensation carrier, however, is almost always barred from subrogating 
against the insured’s own private automobile insurance company.21  
Offsetting is generally not sought by a workers’ compensation carrier 
because when an employee sustains a physical injury in the course and 
scope of employment, workers’ compensation usually provides the primary 
coverage.  The private automobile insurance company, therefore, usually 
does not have a reason to subrogate against the workers’ compensation 
carrier for med-pay benefits paid to the insured.  If the workers’ compensa-
tion carrier provides medical benefits to the employee/insured, the private 
  
 19. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, supra n. 10. 
 20. See e.g. Breen v. Caesars Palace, 715 P.2d 1070, 1071–72 (Nev. 1986) (“Pursuant to NRS 
616.560 [now NRS 616C.215] an employer may assert a subrogation interest in compensation paid to 
an employee by a third-party tortfeasor where a work-related ‘injury was caused under circumstances 
creating a legal liability’ in a third party.”); see also City of Meadville v. Workers’ Compen. App. Bd., 
810 A.2d 703, 705 (Pa. Cmmw. 2002) (“[W]here a third party’s negligent conduct causes injury to an 
employee actually engaged in the business of his employer, there is a clear, justifiable right to subroga-
tion under Section 319 of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act.”); see also Combined Ins. v. Shurter, 607 
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Neb. 2000) (referencing Nebraska Revised Statutes § 48-118, which grants an em-
ployer who has paid workers’ compensation benefits to an employee injured as a result of the actions of 
a third party a subrogation interest against that third party). 
 21. Standish v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 599, 601 (Pa. 1997) (holding that when an insur-
ance policy is specifically designed to benefit the policyholder (such as med-pay benefits) workers’ 
compensation does not have a right of subrogation against the insured’s private automobile insurance 
company); see also River Gas Corp. v. Sutton, 701 So. 2d 35, 39 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (discussing 
same situation in which first-party underinsured benefits of insured were not subject of subrogation by 
workers’ compensation. Same analysis would apply to first-party med-pay benefits.).  This policy is 
also explained in Truck Ins. Exch. v. State Industrial Ins. Sys., 823 P.2d 279 (Nev. 1991) in which the 
court explains that according to statute, workers’ compensation may only subrogate against third-party 
tortfeasors.  The court further explains that proceeds received from a private insurance policy arise 
from a contract between the parties, which does not statutorily qualify as a third-party tortfeasor.  Id. at 
280-81. Furthermore, when an employee is injured in the course and scope of employment, workers’ 
compensation provides primary coverage.  Accordingly, all other forms of private insurance should be 
treated as secondary.  If workers’ compensation were allowed to subrogate against the employee’s 
private insurance, the result would be that the private insurance would be primary coverage for work-
place injuries. 
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automobile insurance company is usually allowed to offset those medical 
benefits before disbursing med-pay benefits, if any, to the insured.22  
Lastly, the situation that is the subject of this Note, and which creates 
the greatest split among jurisdictions, is when an employee is injured by a 
third-party tortfeasor in the course and scope of employment.  Here, the 
workers’ compensation carrier provides initial medical benefits, but will 
then seek reimbursement, through subrogation, from any recovery between 
the employee/insured and the third-party tortfeasor.  Once the workers’ 
compensation carrier is made whole, and therefore out of the picture, 
courts disagree whether the employee/insured can still collect med-pay 
benefits from the private automobile insurance carrier, despite the em-
ployee/insured having his medical payments paid for from the third-party 
tortfeasor.23  
C. Collateral Source Rule 
The collateral source rule provides that admission of a collateral source 
of payment for an injury into evidence is per se improper.24  If this broad 
reading of the collateral source rule were applied to the subrogation and 
offsetting scheme, the rights of the workers’ compensation carrier and the 
insured’s private automobile insurance company would be frustrated be-
cause each party would not know what the other is doing.  Therefore, the 
collateral source rule is usually only applied to the defendant/third-party 
tortfeasor in a personal injury lawsuit.25  
  
 22. See e.g. Griebel v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 311 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 1981) (“Because both no-
fault and workers’ compensation benefits might be payable in some instances, the legislature has stated 
that an additional purpose of the no-fault act is to provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery.  As a part 
of this scheme, the payment of workers’ compensation benefits is primary.   Thus, when a claimant 
receives benefits under no-fault and workers’ compensation, the legislature has indicated that the no-
fault benefits must be reduced by the amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 23. This issue is fully discussed infra Parts IV & V. 
 24. Proctor v. Castelletti, 911 P.2d 853, 854 (Nev. 1996). 
 25. See Cramer v. Peavy, 3 P.3d 665, 669 (Nev. 2000) (explaining that NRS 616C.215 does not 
supersede Proctor, but rather the statute is an exception to the per se rule against collateral sources). 
The Proctor rule must endure against defendants/third-party tortfeasors because otherwise any insured 
plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery in a personal injury lawsuit; see also Bruner v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 627 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. App. 1993) (holding that defendant was not entitled to collateral source 
offset for workers’ compensation benefits despite subrogation waiver); see also Pustaver v. Gooden, 
566 S.E.2d 199, 200–01 (S.C. App. 2002) (explaining that the collateral source rule only applies 
against the tortfeasor); see also Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graser, 647 N.W.2d 385, 388–90 (Wis. App. 
2002) (explaining that the collateral source rule and subrogation are complementary legal concepts, and 
disallowing plaintiff’s invocation of the collateral source rule to bar subrogation); but see John L. 
Antracoli, Note, California’s Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff’s Receipt of Uninsured Motorist 
Benefits, 37 Hastings L.J. 667 (1986) (arguing that the California collateral source rule should be ap-
plied uniformly to uninsured motorist benefits except when plaintiff’s insurer has brought a previous 
action against the uninsured motorist). 
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III. RUBIN V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY26 
A. Facts 
While in the course and scope of her employment, Anna Rubin was 
struck by a vehicle as she walked near the loading dock of a grocery 
store.27  The State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS)28 paid Rubin’s 
medical bills, totaling more than $11,500.00.29  
After SIIS realized that Rubin’s injuries were caused by the negligent 
acts of third-party tortfeasors, it notified Rubin that SIIS would seek reim-
bursement from any third-party recoveries Rubin might obtain from the 
tortfeasors.30  
When Rubin discovered that SIIS would seek reimbursement, she filed 
suit against the third-party driver and the owner of the grocery store (tort-
feasors) where the accident occurred.31 Following Rubin’s settlement with 
the tortfeasors, SIIS required her to reimburse it eighty percent of the 
amount it had asserted as its lien.32  
Rubin also filed a claim for medical payment benefits with her private 
automobile insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
  
 26. 43 P.3d 1018 (Nev. 2002). 
 27. Id. at 1019. 
 28. The court noted that in July 2000, SIIS was renamed Employer’s Insurance Company of Ne-
vada. But, because the events surrounding this case took place before the name change, the Rubin 
opinion uniformly referred to the entity as SIIS. Id. at 1019 & n. 1. The author refers to either of these 
entities as workers’ compensation. 
 29. Id. at 1019. 
 30. Id. SIIS had a statutory right, according to Nevada Revised Statutes 616C.215, “to receive 
reimbursement by creating a lien on the ‘total proceeds’ that an injured employee recovers from third 
persons, which might include recovery for non-economic as well as economic damages.” Id. In some 
jurisdictions, the law requires either that the plaintiff seek recovery from the third-party tortfeasor, or 
the insurer will be able to stand in the shoes of the insured. See e.g. Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-11.1(c) 
(Harrison 1998) (“[A third-party action] against [a third party] by the employee must be instituted in all 
cases within the applicable statute of limitations. If such action is not brought by the employee within 
one year after the date of injury, then the employer or such employer’s insurer may but is not required 
to assert the employee’s cause of action in tort, either in its own name or in the name of the em-
ployee.”); Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1984) (finding that Florida Statute § 
440.39(2) gives the carrier the right to institute an action against the third-party tortfeasor if the em-
ployee does not institute an action during the first year after the accrual of the cause of action). 
 31. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1019.  The fact that Rubin filed suit against the tortfeasors implies that she 
believed that she would be able to recover some amount in excess of what she would have to reimburse 
SIIS. Therefore, this arrangement would allow perhaps a substantial recovery by a plaintiff, such as 
Rubin, from the third party in cases involving multiple tortfeasors.  
 32. Id. The court pointed out that SIIS is required to contribute a proportionate share of litigation 
expenses, according to Breen v. Caesars Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1986). So, after Rubin repaid the 
eighty percent asserted in the SIIS lien, the court speculated that Rubin and SIIS were negotiating on 
how much of the remaining twenty percent would be applied to litigation expenses. See Rubin, 43 P.3d 
at 1019 n. 3.  
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Company (State Farm).33  State Farm denied coverage, based on an exclu-
sionary clause in Rubin’s policy: “THERE IS NO COVERAGE: FOR 
MEDICAL EXPENSES FOR BODILY INJURY: TO THE EXTENT 
WORKER’S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE REQUIRED TO BE 
PAYABLE . . . .”34  Moreover, State Farm argued that SIIS had already 
paid Rubin’s medical bills, so the exclusion was triggered, and any cover-
age from State Farm would constitute a double recovery of medical ex-
penses.35  
B. Procedural History 
Rubin filed a complaint against State Farm in Nevada state court alleg-
ing breach of contract and bad faith denial of coverage.36  State Farm re-
moved the matter to federal district court and filed a motion for summary 
judgment.37  The federal district court granted State Farm’s motion for 
summary judgment, reasoning that State Farm’s exclusion controlled and 
State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Rubin 
could not prove that she had any medical bills that were not paid or pay-
able by SIIS.38  
Rubin appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which declined 
to rule on the issue.39  Instead, the Ninth Circuit certified two questions to 
the Nevada Supreme Court:  
(1) Under Nevada law, does a provision in an automobile insurance 
policy excluding coverage for medical expenses resulting from 
bodily injury for which workers’ compensation is payable apply to 
medical expenses that are paid by workers’ compensation but re-
covered from a third-party tortfeasor? 
(2) If the exclusionary clause is interpreted to apply to those ex-
penses, does it violate Nevada public policy?40 
The Nevada Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, 
concluding that “the policy exclusion at issue does not apply to medical 
expenses initially paid by workers’ compensation but ultimately reim-
  
 33. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1019. (emphasis in original). 
 34. Id. at 1019–20. 
 35. Id. at 1020.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. The Ninth Circuit opinion is reported at Rubin v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 
F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 40. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1019.   
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bursed from the insured’s third-party recovery.”41  Since the first question 
was answered in the negative, the second question was irrelevant and, 
therefore, was not addressed.42  
C. Reasoning 
In addressing the first certified question, the Nevada Supreme Court 
examined the exclusion as a “matter of contract interpretation” requiring an 
examination of the policy language.43  
Before getting to the substance of the contractual provisions, the Rubin 
court set forth three well-established principles in interpreting insurance 
contracts.  First, when determining an insurance policy’s meaning, the 
court will examine the language from a layperson’s viewpoint.44 Second, 
an insurer that intends to restrict a policy’s coverage must use language 
that clearly communicates the scope of the limitation to the insured.45  
Third, any ambiguity or uncertainty in the policy must be construed against 
the insurer and in favor of coverage for the insured.46  
Rubin contended that the “required to be payable” language referred to 
benefits that “are non-returnable or non-refundable to SIIS.”47  Rubin fur-
ther argued that because the medical benefits initially advanced to Rubin 
by SIIS were largely reimbursed through her later third-party recoveries, 
her medical expenses were not within the exclusion.48  State Farm, how-
  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1020. 
 44. Id. This principle was confirmed in Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Reno’s Exec. Air, 682 P.2d 
1380, 1382 (Nev. 1984) (“In determining the meaning of an insurance policy, the language should be 
examined from the viewpoint of one not trained in law or in the insurance business; the terms should be 
understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense.”). 
 45. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020.  This principle was confirmed in Reno’s Exec. Air, 682 P.2d at 1382 
(“[A]n insurer wishing to restrict the coverage of a policy should employ language which clearly and 
distinctly communicates to the insured the nature of the limitation.”). 
 46. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020.  This principle was also confirmed in Reno’s Exec. Air, 682 P.2d at 
1383 (“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be resolved against the insurer and in 
favor of the insured.”). This third principle is sometimes referred to as contra proferentum, literally 
meaning “against him who proffers.” See Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary 452, 
1457 (Oxford 1995) (1879); see also Dickenson v. Nev. Dept. of Wildlife, 877 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Nev. 
1994) (Rose, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing the maxim of contra proferentum as construing 
a document against the State). The doctrine of contra proferentum is more commonly known as “con-
strue against the drafter.” See Am. Fire & Safety, Inc. v. City of North Las Vegas, 849 P.2d 352, 362 
(Nev. 1993) (“[W]e construe an ambiguous contract provision against . . . the drafter of the ambiguous 
provision.”). 
 47. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020.   
 48. Id. 
File: echols[1].final(macro)moyermaier Created on:  3/10/2004 2:59 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 10:02 AM 
26 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 2, No. 1 
ever, asserted that “the exclusion is unambiguous and applies because the 
workers’ compensation benefits were ‘payable.’”49 
The Nevada Supreme Court explained that the language of the exclu-
sion is clear when applied to usual workers’ compensation cases.  The ex-
clusion’s application usually occurs when an employee is injured on the 
job and receives workers’ compensation benefits without the existence of a 
third-party tortfeasor.50  In such a case, workers’ compensation benefits are 
paid to the injured employee and the payment is not reimbursed.  Accord-
ingly, a private insurer would be able to offset the amount paid or payable 
to the injured employee from workers’ compensation.51  The policy behind 
this law is noted by the court:  
The primary purpose of this anti-duplication clause is to memorial-
ize that SIIS is the primary source of payment when an insured is 
involved in a work-related automobile accident, and to prevent 
double recovery by the insured for the same element of loss.52  
 
The Rubin court next determined that when the insured is forced to re-
imburse the workers’ compensation carrier out of personal assets, the ap-
plicability of the exclusion is uncertain.53  As such, a latent ambiguity re-
sulted; even though the benefits were not only payable, but paid, and then 
reimbursed, the benefits may be considered ‘payable’ under the exclusion 
or ‘not payable’ since Rubin did not retain them once SIIS was reimbursed 
from the third-party settlement.54  Accordingly, the court reasoned, “Rubin 
has been placed in the position of one for whom workers’ compensation 
  
 49. Id. By using the word “payable” instead of “paid” in its policy, State Farm takes itself out of the 
potential dispute involving what was actually paid, instead of what should have been paid by the claim-
ant’s other sources. See Employers Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 23 P.3d 255, 258 (Nev. 2001) (“[A]n insurer is 
entitled to withhold payment of medical benefits for a work-related injury until an employee has ex-
hausted any third-party settlement proceeds because the plain meaning of the term ‘compensation’ in 
NRS 616C.215 includes medical benefits.”). Therefore, if a claimant has not exhausted payment of 
medical benefits from other sources, the excess insurer may treat the other payments as exhausted for 
purposes of offsetting to calculate how much the insurer should pay to its claimant, provided that the 
policy language allows the offset, according to category of source. 
 50. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020. 
 51. See discussion supra n. 49 on the difference between “payable” and “paid.” Some policies are 
actually construed to mean “payable” instead of “paid.” See Contl. Cas. Co. v. Riveras, 814 P.2d 1015, 
1018 (Nev. 1991) (holding that benefits payable to school district employee would be reduced by 
amount of unreimbursed compensation employee received from SIIS) (emphasis added). 
 52. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020. The double recovery, then, in workplace injury cases not involving a 
third-party tortfeasor would be one recovery from workers’ compensation and another recovery from 
the employee’s own private insurance. 
 53. Id. at 1021. 
 54. Id. (citing  Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d vol. 2, § 21.12 (Clark 
Boardman Callaghan 1997)). 
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benefits were never payable.”55  As a result, the Rubin court found that the 
exclusion did not apply.56  The court also rejected State Farm’s argument 
that it could escape liability based on “other insurance” that had been ren-
dered “out-of-pocket.”57 
Elaborating on the offsetting problem, the Rubin court explained fur-
ther that “reimbursement nullifies the initial payment.”58  In other words, 
SIIS’ initial payments were more akin to an advance.59  Moreover, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court opined that any concern about double recovery was 
non-existent because “[w]here there is a recovery from a third-party tort-
feasor, the ultimate payment of medical expenses is not by workers’ com-
pensation, but by the injured party herself.”60  
Finally, the court recognized that other courts have applied exclusion 
clauses in cases involving similar facts to Rubin.61  The Rubin court, how-
ever, decided to side with those courts, holding that “such exclusions or 
offset provisions lose their meaning when the workers’ compensation in-
surer successfully asserts its subrogation rights on third-party proceeds.”62  
One such court was the Florida Second District Court of Appeal, which 
held that “an insured in this situation is in the same position as one who 
never had any workers’ compensation benefits paid  . . . . The insured 
should not be penalized simply because he was hurt on the job.”63  There-
fore, the Nevada Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the 
  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (referencing Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110, 119 (Or. 
1959) (“The ‘other insurance’ clauses of all policies are but methods used by insurers to limit their 
liability, whether using language that relieves them from all liability (usually referred to as an “escape 
clause”) or that used by St. Paul (usually referred to as an “excess clause”) or that used by Oregon 
(usually referred to as a “pro-rata clause”). In our opinion, whether one policy uses one clause or an-
other, when any come in conflict with the “other insurance” clause of another insurer, regardless of the 
nature of the clause, they are in fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto.”)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (quoting Rubin v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 61. Id at 1022. (referencing Sandoval, supra n. 2); see infra discussion, Part V. 
 62. Id. (referencing Antram v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 837, 840 (Ala. 1973) (reasoning 
that when an injured employee received a third-party recovery in excess of workers’ compensation 
benefits and any benefits paid by workers’ compensation were reimbursed, there was no liability on the 
compensation carrier to “pay” workers’ compensation benefits)); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 
467 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1985) (construing state statutes governing workers’ compensa-
tion benefits); Grello v. Daszykowski, 379 N.E.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. 1978) (concluding that if workers’ 
compensation carrier executes on lien, no-fault carrier must bear loss since reimbursed amount is not an 
amount recovered or recoverable under workers’ compensation) (superseded by statute as explained in, 
Fox v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d  442, 446 (N.Y. Sup. 1987)); Moeller v. Associated Hosp. 
Serv., 106 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (N.Y. 1952) (Fuld, J., dissenting) (noting that reimbursed workers’ com-
pensation benefits are temporary and urging that insurance policy excluding benefits “provided for” 
under workers’ compensation was not intended to exclude benefits only temporarily provided); see also 
infra discussion, Part IV. 
 63. Arnold, 467 So. 2d at 324. 
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negative: “the State Farm exclusion at issue does not apply with respect to 
workers’ compensation benefits paid but ultimately reimbursed from the 
insured’s third-party recovery.” 64  
IV. ANALYSIS OF RUBIN 
A. Interpretation of Exclusionary Clauses 
Just as the Rubin court found that an exclusion in med-pay coverage 
for workers’ compensation benefits “payable or paid” does not operate to 
offset workers’ compensation benefits when they are reimbursed by a 
third-party tortfeasor, courts from other jurisdictions have reached similar 
results, which provide additional explanation to the reasoning of Rubin.  
The Rubin decision points to Antram v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance 
Company65 which is representative of the position that payable or paid 
clauses lose their meaning after workers’ compensation has been reim-
bursed by the third-party tortfeasor.66  Antram involved a salary continua-
tion provision in a sickness and accident policy with a similar exclusion as 
the one in the State Farm policy in Rubin.  The Antram court went beyond 
Rubin, finding that when the workers’ compensation carrier was reim-
bursed, the payable or paid language in the exclusionary clause was not 
ambiguous since workers’ compensation benefits were not payable because 
of the third-party recovery.67 Accordingly, the insured was entitled to pay-
ment from the sickness and accident policy as well as his recovery from 
the third-party tortfeasor in excess of the reimbursement to workers’ com-
pensation.68   
The opposite view of Antram, that workers’ compensation exclusion-
ary clauses do not lose their meaning even after reimbursement by a third-
party tortfeasor, is expressed in Wise v. American Casualty Company.69   In 
  
 64. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1022. 
 65. 287 So. 2d 837 (Ala. 1973). 
 66. See also State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ley, 844 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Mo. App. 1992) 
(holding that the phrase “required to be payable” contained in the exclusionary portion of State Farm's 
Medical Payments Coverage was ambiguous and thus strictly construed the exclusionary clause against 
insurer so as to provide for coverage of medical expenses, and reasoning that the word “required” 
mandates conduct while the word “payable” has a passive connotation, meaning that the phrase “re-
quired to be payable” was equivalent to stating that it was mandatory that an amount “may, can or 
should be paid”). 
 67. Antram, 287 So. 2d at 839–40. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 161 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. App. 1968); see also Milliron v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co., 566 P.2d 582, 
584 (Wash. App. 1977) (explaining that although exclusionary clauses are to be construed in favor of 
the insured, the exclusionary clause was not ambiguous, and therefore, the court cannot rewrite the 
contract or override the apparent intention of the parties); Kerry v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 
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Wise, the plaintiff argued that because workers’ compensation was reim-
bursed by the third-party tortfeasor, the workers’ compensation benefits 
were never payable or paid.70  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the 
Wise court held that workers’ compensation was payable within the mean-
ing of the exclusionary clause.71  The court explained further that “this 
result is not changed by the fact that the employer was subsequently reim-
bursed for medical expenses actually paid to the plaintiff . . . . In effect, 
reimbursement to the employer was made, not by the plaintiff, but by the 
tortfeasor.”72 
Although there are two opposing approaches to whether such exclu-
sionary clauses contain ambiguities, the fact that courts have found ambi-
guities in such clauses seems to be results-oriented.  That is to say, it ap-
pears that courts have found ambiguities in these situations only for the 
purpose of construing the language against the insurance companies for the 
sole purpose of allowing plaintiffs to recover. 
B. Workers’ Compensation Benefits Never Received 
Rubin heavily relied upon South Carolina Insurance Company v. Ar-
nold in reaching its final conclusion that the exclusion did not apply.73  The 
Arnold court notes that when workers’ compensation benefits are received 
and reimbursed, it is as if the benefits were never received.74 Moreover, the 
court explains that when only the tortfeasor and the insured are involved in 
an accident, there is no question that the insured is entitled to no-fault 
benefits.75  
Under the representative Arnold view that workers’ compensation 
benefits are never received, and that as a corollary, exclusionary clauses 
are inoperative, cases involving the Rubin situation should simply be 
treated as though workers’ compensation was never a party.  As such, the 
insured would be entitled to recovery from the tortfeasor, and the only per-
  
Co., 395 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ohio App. 3d Dist. 1978) (“Where, however, the language of the policy is 
clear, as it is here, no need for construction arises and the rule of strict construction has no applica-
tion.”); Starett v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 397, 400 (Okla. 1993) (holding 
that an exclusion in an automobile insurance policy, which excludes coverage for the insured's medical 
expenses when those expenses had been paid under the workers' compensation law, does not reserve 
the insurer's right to subrogation or set-off for medical payments made to the insured under the policy. 
It is, rather, a contractual exclusion of coverage to the extent the insured is reimbursed by workers' 
compensation.). 
 70. Wise, 161 S.E.2d at 393. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 393–94. 
 73. 467 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 1985). 
 74. Id. at 325–26. 
 75. Id. 
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tinent question regarding the private automobile insurance company would 
be whether med-pay benefits are subject to subrogation or offsetting, de-
pending on what order the benefits are received.76 
Since it has been established in Nevada that med-pay benefits are not 
subject to subrogation,77 Rubin correctly held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to both med-pay benefits and any excess recovery from the third-party 
tortfeasor.  Yet, even in those jurisdictions where a similar policy against 
subrogation of med-pay benefits exists, the policy should be revisited be-
cause of the repercussions, discussed below, that such a policy brings. 
V.  A BETTER APPROACH TO THE RUBIN SITUATION 
A. The Purpose of No-Fault Med-Pay Benefits is not Frustrated 
The main purpose of no-fault med-pay benefits is to provide prompt 
medical benefits to the insured.78  Under the Arnold approach to the Rubin 
situation, it is held that when the workers’ compensation is reimbursed, it 
is though as workers’ compensation was never a party to the action.  The 
Rubin court ingeniously points out, however, that the initial workers’ com-
pensation benefits were “akin to an advance.”79  In this point alone, there is 
a great difference between the Rubin situation and the situation when 
workers’ compensation is absent. 
Because workers’ compensation provides an “advance,” the em-
ployee/insured is provided with immediate and prompt medical benefits. 
As such, workers’ compensation replaces the need for immediate and 
prompt benefits from med-pay coverage.80  In this sense, the workers’ 
compensation carrier is the primary no-fault benefits provider, which is 
consistent with the policy that workers’ compensation provides benefits 
coverage for injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment.81  
Therefore, when subrogation or offsetting of med-pay benefits is permit-
ted, the purpose and need for immediate and prompt medical benefits is not 
frustrated. 
  
 76. See supra discussion, Part II.B. 
 77. Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 728 P.2d 812, 813 (Nev. 1986) (“We hold that a subrogation 
clause under which the insurer obtains subrogation rights from its insured for medical payments vio-
lates public policy.”). 
 78. See supra discussion, Part II.A. 
 79. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1021. 
 80. See Perez v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. 1984) (noting the 
inverse that when workers’ compensation benefits are not immediately received because of employer 
failure to carry or employee failure to claim, no-fault benefits from automobile insurance policy are 
available). 
 81. See infra discussion, Part V.C. 
File: echols[1].final(macro)moyermaier Created on: 3/10/2004 2:59 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 10:02 AM 
2004 RUBIN V. STATE FARM 31 
B. Discouraging the Windfall of a Double Recovery82 
In the ordinary subrogation situation, when workers’ compensation is 
not involved, the recovery of med-pay benefits from the insurer as well as 
payment for medical expenses from the tortfeasor is not considered an im-
permissible double recovery in Nevada.83  The policy behind this permissi-
ble double recovery is that when an insured receives med-pay benefits, he 
is “merely receiving the benefits for which he has already paid.”84  And, if 
subrogation were allowed, it would result in “a windfall recovery for the 
insurer” because premiums are usually not lowered after subrogation.85 
This “windfall recovery” of insurance premiums hardly compares to 
the double recovery an employee/insured receives for one physical in-
jury.86  Once the employee/insured’s medical bills are paid by workers’ 
compensation, and subsequently replaced with a recovery from the third-
party tortfeasor, the employee/insured no longer has need to be reimbursed 
for medical expenses.   But without subrogation and offsetting, the em-
  
 82. See generally Andrea L. Parry, Subrogation in Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of Insurers 
and Insureds in Settlements with Third-Party Tortfeasors, 56 Temp. L.Q. 667 (1983) (discussing the 
priority problems in Pennsylvania when two insurers have subrogation rights over the same proceeds of 
a third-party recovery); Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Insurance and Subrogation: When the Pie Isn’t Big 
Enough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337 (1997) (commenting on various methods of subroga-
tion and advocating a pro tanto approach to insurance subrogation, which allows the insurance com-
pany to recover before the insured has been made whole); Todd L. Fulks, The “Made-Whole” Doc-
trine: Its Effect on Tennessee Tort Litigation and Insurance Subrogation Rights, 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 
87 (2001) (commenting on the Tennessee “made-whole” doctrine which does not allow insurance 
companies of plaintiffs to exercise their subrogation rights against third-party tortfeasors when the 
court makes a finding, which is sometimes arbitrary, that plaintiff has not been made whole). 
 83. Maxwell, 728 P.2d at 815. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. This same argument can also be made as against workers’ compensation insurance after it 
seeks subrogation in Rubin situations. See infra discussion, Part V.C. 
 86. Ellison v. California State Automobile Assn., 797 P.2d 975, 977 (Nev. 1990) (“‘[T]he setoff 
clause only operates to prevent double recovery for the same elements of damage’. . . . A recovery in 
excess of one hundred percent of damages is a windfall which this court will not countenance absent a 
clear agreement providing for such coverage.”) (emphasis added); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 705 
P.2d 156, 159 (Nev. 1985) (holding that “because Daniel has received or been awarded compensation 
to the full extent of her injuries, we conclude that Daniel is not entitled to an additional $ 10,000.00 in 
underinsured motorist benefits. To hold otherwise would allow Daniel a double recovery for the same 
item of damages.”); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cramer, 857 P.2d 751, 754–55 (Nev. 
1993) (finding that insured was not entitled to additional reimbursement for his medical expenses under 
his catastrophic medical expense rider with insurer because it was excess coverage and he was fully 
compensated under his health and automobile insurance policies); Laurence v. State Farm Mut. Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 984 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. App. Austin Dist. 1999) (“A right of subrogation evinces a 
policy that an injured person be made whole, but not better than whole . . . . ‘[I]n no event shall the 
insured recover under both coverages more than the actual damages suffered.’); LeBeau v. John Deere 
Ins., 574 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 1998) (“The district court properly concluded that John Deere is 
not liable to pay any amount of LeBeau’s claim that would result in a double recovery; the record 
indicates, however, that the payment of $500.05 would not result in a double recovery.”). 
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ployee/insured receives an additional payment for medical expenses that 
cannot be applied to medical expenses.87  
The representative view of Arnold, as adopted in Rubin, contends that 
the employee/insured should not be penalized simply because he was hurt 
on the job.88  This argument only makes sense if a double recovery is as-
sumed.  For example, when an employee/insured has had all of his medical 
expenses paid, and has possibly received a recovery for other expenses and 
losses from the third-party tortfeasor, it is supposedly a detriment to the 
employee/insured if he is not given a second set of payments for his physi-
cal injury.89  
Interestingly, this double recovery that the employee/insured receives 
is the very equity enforced when the workers’ compensation carrier subro-
gates against the third-party tortfeasor.90  Equity for the workers’ compen-
sation carrier should also be equity for the private automobile insurance 
companies; however, since the workers’ compensation carrier has the pri-
mary right of subrogation, the private automobile insurance company 
should be permitted to offset funds that the insured has recovered from the 
third-party tortfeasor.91  The only party punished should be the third-party 
tortfeasor.92  The appropriate remedy for this problem is subrogation and 
offsetting of med-pay benefits. 
  
 87. See Moeller v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Capital Dist., 106 N.E.2d 16, 17 (N.Y. 1952) (“The 
initial liability is the employer's, and the ultimate liability therefor falls, as it should, upon the wrong-
doer responsible for his injuries. To adopt plaintiff's view would give him a windfall; without paying 
these expenses, he would in effect be collecting his hospital bill from the third-party wrongdoer for his 
employer, and again from the defendant.”). 
 88. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1021–22. 
 89. Moeller, 106 N.E.2d at 17–18 (“When it is recognized that the statute provides for hospital care 
in any event, giving to the employer or its carrier a right of recovery against the third party through the 
medium of the employee's action against said party, or, if the employee chooses not to sue, through its 
own action, it becomes apparent that the employee does not pay for his own hospital service. The initial 
liability is the employer's, and the ultimate liability therefor falls, as it should, upon the wrongdoer 
responsible for his injuries. To adopt plaintiff's view would give him a windfall; without paying these 
expenses, he would in effect be collecting his hospital bill from the third-party wrongdoer for his em-
ployer, and again from the defendant.”). 
 90. See Employers Ins. Co. of Nev. v. Chandler, 23 P.3d 255, 258 (Nev. 2001) (“In fact, when read 
within the context of NRS 616A.035, NRS 616A.090, and NRS 617.130, the term ‘compensation’ in 
NRS 616C.215 clearly and unambiguously includes medical benefits. Further, the contemplated pur-
pose of NRS 616C.215 is to make the insurer whole and to prevent an employee from receiving an 
impermissible double recovery.”). 
 91. See supra discussion, Part II.B. 
 92. See Moeller, 106, N.E.2d at 17; Cochran v. Miss. Hosp. & Med. Servs., 182 So. 2d 597, 598 
(Miss. 1966) (The court found that an insured who was injured on his job and who had his medical bills 
paid by his employer’s compensation carrier, but subsequently reimbursed the compensation carrier for 
such payments out of a recovery by him and the carrier in a third-party suit against the negligent tort-
feasor, was not entitled to recover on the policy sued on. Affirming the judgment in favor of the in-
surer, the court pointed out that the insured did not pay his own medical expenses, since the initial 
liability under the statute was with the employer, and that the ultimate liability fell upon the wrongdoer 
responsible for his injuries, and concluded that to adopt the insured’s view would give him a windfall, 
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C. Primary Coverage for Injuries in the Course and Scope of Employment 
by Workers’ Compensation 
Although Rubin acknowledges that injuries sustained in the course and 
scope of employment should be covered by workers’ compensation,93 
Rubin considers the policy of allowing policyholders to receive med-pay 
benefits for their premiums to be more important, despite a permissible 
double recovery by the insured.  Accordingly, Rubin and similar cases re-
sult in the two bad public policies of (1) requiring private automobile in-
surance companies to provide, in essence, primary coverage for injuries 
sustained in the course and scope of employment; and (2) allowing em-
ployees/insureds to receive double recovery.94  
The California case Bailey v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automo-
bile Club of Southern California points out that workers’ compensation is 
the primary carrier to look to when there are injuries in the course and 
scope of employment, notwithstanding the Rubin situation:  
Workmen’s compensation coverage is an integral part of our insur-
ance system in providing medical coverage for persons injured in 
the course of their employment, and a person who has been injured 
in the course of his employment through the acts of a third party 
tortfeasor generally looks to the workmen’s compensation carrier 
as the primary provider of medical benefits . . . . Hence, it has be-
come commonplace in various forms of medical and disability in-
surance policies to include an exclusion from the policy for bene-
fits obtainable under workmen’s compensation law. These exclu-
sions are clearly consistent with public policy.95 
Furthermore, when a third-party tortfeasor causes the injury, it is equi-
table to compel the third-party tortfeasor to provide coverage for the loss, 
thereby shifting the burden from workers’ compensation to the third-party 
tortfeasor.  There is, however, no justification for allowing the burden to 
provide coverage to pass to the private automobile insurance companies.  
Hence, it is bad public policy to require private automobile insurance com-
panies to provide primary coverage for injuries sustained in the course and 
scope of employment. 96  This has expressly been admitted in Florida97 and 
  
since that would allow him to collect his medical bills from the third-party wrongdoer for his employer, 
as required by the statute, and again for himself under the policy in question.). 
 93. Rubin, 43 P.3d at 1020. 
 94. See supra discussion, Part V.B. 
 95. 122 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510 (Cal. App. 1975). 
 96. See Fox v. A. Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446–47 (N.Y. Sup. 1987) (acknowledging the 
problem of having the private automobile insurance company provide primary coverage for injuries 
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will be the eventual result of the holding in Rubin, especially when work-
ers’ compensation provides nothing more than an advance.  To counter this 
bad public policy, subrogation and offsetting of med-pay benefits by the 
private automobile insurance company should be allowed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When an employee is injured in the course and scope of his employ-
ment, workers’ compensation provides coverage for medical expenses. 
When a third-party tortfeasor is the cause of the employee’s injury, how-
ever, workers’ compensation will assert its subrogation rights to reimburse 
itself for benefits paid to the employee.  Furthermore, when courts allow 
the employee to also recover on a private automobile insurance policy with 
med-pay benefits, the courts have essentially required no workers’ com-
pensation coverage for an injury sustained in the course and scope of em-
ployment.  The private automobile insurance company becomes the pri-
mary coverage for such injuries.  These two resulting bad public policies 
can be abrogated by allowing the private automobile insurance company to 
subrogate and offset med-pay benefits whenever such equitable measures 
are needed to prohibit double recovery by the employee/insured. 
 
  
sustained in the workplace, and noting state legislation which has attempted to make workers’ compen-
sation the primary carrier for workplace injuries). 
 97. Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 571 So. 2d 546, 547 & n.1 (Fla. App. 1990) (“Florida Statutes § 
627.736(4) (1985), effectively makes both PIP and workers' compensation primary coverage for a 
work-related automobile accident. It is unusual for two insurance companies to provide primary cover-
age without a system to determine permanently their respective priorities through ‘other insurance’ 
clauses or similar procedures. The problems demonstrated by this case and similar cases suggest that 
the legislature might well reconsider the advisability of making both PIP and workers' compensation 
primary coverage in these cases. Although the primary responsibility for claims handling may rest 
logically with the workers' compensation carrier, it would be simpler if the primary responsibility for 
the payment of benefits rested with the PIP carrier to the extent of that coverage. That method would 
eliminate the need for subsequent reimbursements.”)   
